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"The punishment which the wise suffer who refuse to take part in government, is to live under the government of worse men" - Plato 427-347 BC |
However, what does the term "resolved' mean? Although nurses are required to follow the injured employee's progress for a period of 60 days, DFEC has not reported what this monitoring reveals. Furthermore, DFEC does not report how many of these "resolutions" were successful, i.e., how many of these return-to-work efforts were sustained on appeal and how many injured workers actually remain employed. The return to work success could be measured by determining how many of the Claimant receiving early nurse intervention services suffer a recurrence of disability. Similarly, it would be worthwhile to know how many Claimants actually find early nurse intervention to be better service since this is one of the reasons DFEC implemented the process.(*164) DFEC Tightens the Screws___________________________________________________ *163 FY96 Report at 38. *164 "To provide better service to Claimants and effect cost savings as well, DFEC instituted new case management procedures in 1993.... They rely heavily on the use of registered nurses under contract to OWCP to work with ] Claimants and their physicians to clarify the nature and extent of injury-related disability." Id. It would also be useful to know how Claimants'physicians view this service. *165 62 Fed. Reg. 67,120 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 10). *166 20 C.F.R. § 10.150(b) (1996). Page 71
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DFEC proposes to drop this language as unnecessary.(*167) DFEC wants to further divorce itself from the general concept of workers' compensation and the equitable principles which form the basis for this remedial social covenant. As noted above, injured employees are not given enough time to submit necessary information. As a result their claims are prematurely denied and this results in an inevitable remand. The current regulations state
Director, DFEC Markey has already acknowledged that District Offices are not complying with this regulation. Furthermore, it is obvious that 30 days is too short a period. Acting Director Hallmark testified that the 30 day period would be extended for good cause. However, rather than modify the regulation to incorporate the good cause extension, DFEC instead has shortened the period. The proposed regulation states ___________________________________________________*167 62 Fed. Reg. 67,121. *168 20 C.F.R. § 10.110.(b). Page 72
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Where 30 days had been the minimum time period allowed for the submission of evidence, it has now become the maximum. As noted above, it does not appear reasonable to grant injured employees less time to submit evidence when they already have insufficient time. Similarly, when DFEC intends to reduce or terminate benefits, the proposed regulations state
The proposed regulations further state: "OWCP will not grant any request for an extension of this 30-day period."(*171) With respect to the development of evidence, DFEC has chosen to neglect its obligation to see that justice is done by sharing in the burden of going forward with the evidence, In the preamble to its proposed regulations DFEC states: ___________________________________________________*169 Section 10.121 at 62 Fed. Reg. 67,143 (emphasis added). *170 Section 10.540(a) at 62 Fed. Reg. 67,156. *171 Id., Section 10.541(a). Page 73
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The FECA is remedial legislation and DFEC is charged with insuring that injured employees are treated in a fair and equitable manner. Since proceedings under the FECA are not adversarial, principles of equity demand that DFEC not act as a disinterested arbiter but assist Claimants with the development of their claims. This assistance does not replace the Claimant's ultimate burden of persuasion but represents DFEC's duty to see that justice is done, In addition to stiffening a Claimant's burden of persuasion, DFEC has eliminated its own burden of proof for rescinding acceptance of claims. It is well established by ECAB case law that once DFEC accepts a claim, it has the burden of justifying termination of modification of compensation. (*173) This holds true where DFEC later decides that it has erroneously accepted a claim for compensation. To justify rescission of acceptance, DFEC must establish that its prior acceptance was erroneous based on new or different evidence or through new legal argument and/or rationale.(*174) In Daniel E. Phillips(*175) the ECAB held that in order to reopen and rescind its prior acceptance of a claim, DFEC "must establish that its prior acceptance was ___________________________________________________ *173 See Frank J. Mela, Jr., 41 ECAB 115 (1989); Harold S. McGough, 36 ECAB 332 (1984). *174 See Laura H. Hoexter (Nicholas P. Hoexter), 44 ECAB 987 (1993); Alphonzo Walker, 42 ECAB 129 1990), petition for recon. denied, 42 ECAB 659 (1991); Beth A. Quimby, 41 ECAB 683 (1990); Roseanna Brennan, 41 ECAB 92 (1989), petition for recon. denied, 41 ECAB 371, (1990); Daniel E.Phillips, 40 ECAB 1111 (1989), petition for recon. denied, 41 ECAB 201 (1990). *175 40 ECAB 1111 (1989), petition for recon. denied 41 ECAB 201 (1989). Page 74
============================================================= erroneous through new or different evidence and that it is not merely second-guessing the initial set of adjudicating officials." In Roseanna Brennan(*176) the ECAB indicated that DFEC was obliged to "[introduce] new evidence, legal arguments, and rationale which justify its rescission" of the prior acceptance. In Beth A. Quimby(*177) the ECAB stated: "to justify a rescission of acceptance of a claim, [DFEC] must show that it based its decision on new evidence, legal arguments and/or rationale.' The proposed regulations eliminate this requirement noting: "[the ECAB reached [its] conclusion without specifying any statutory or regulatory basis for this limitation. Its only rationale was its opinion that reopening a decision should not become a surreptitious route for OWCP to readjudicate a claim."(*178) DFEC states that the proposed regulation "adopts the long-standing position of the Director [OWCP] that the plain language of section 8128(a) authorizes the Director, without pre-condition, to review a decision "at any time." It is questionable whether DFEC has the authority to limit the jurisdiction of the ECAB to review the actions of the Director in rescinding the acceptance of claims. Section 8149 of the FECA describes the authority of the Secretary with regard to the ECAB. This authority has not been delegated, along with the other powers of the Secretary under the FECA, to the Director, OWCP. Similarly, the principle of stare decisis would appear to deprive DFEC of the authority to question the legitimacy of ECAB case law in this manner.___________________________________________________ *176 41 ECAB 92 (1989), petition for recon. denied 41 ECAB 371 (1990). *177 41 ECAB 683 (1990). *178 62 Fed. Reg. 67,127. Page 75
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Contents - Perez Testimony | FedupFeds Report -- survey results | Appendix to Report |
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